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Abstract 
We use administrative micro-data to investigate exits from unemployment of benefit 
recipients in Spain. Because the data allow us to distinguish between transitions to a 
new job and recall to the same employer, we apply a competing risks model with 
observed and unobserved heterogeneity. We are also able to control for the type of 
benefit received by the worker: insurance benefit or assistance benefit. We find 
significant differences between the new job hazard and the recall hazard. Both hazard 
rates increase around the time that insurance benefit elapses. We also find that when 
larger firms recall unemployed workers they tend to do so faster than smaller firms. In 
general, our results are consistent with predictions derived from search and implicit 
contract models. They highlight the importance of taking into account the possibility of 
recall in the analysis of unemployment duration among unemployment benefit 
recipients. 
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1. Introduction 
Workers in temporary layoff are those whose unemployment spells end in re-
employment by the previous employer. Previous literature has paid attention to the fact 
that individual transitions out of unemployment depend on the extent to which recall by 
the previous employer is expected (Katz, 1986; Jensen and Westergård-Nielsen, 1990; 
Corak, 1996; Rosholm and Svarer, 2001; Jensen and Svarer, 2003; Røed and Nordberg, 
2003). This literature has also found significant differences between the effects of the 
explanatory variables on the recall and the new job hazard rates. In particular, firm 
incentives (the degree of experience rating) play a key role in the timing of recalls, in so 
far as the publicly financed temporary dismissal period (with unemployment benefits) 
may be a direct subsidy to firm-specific pools of labour (Feldstein, 1975, 1976; Baily, 
1977). 
 
Given that the Spanish unemployment compensation system (UCS) does not contain 
any element of “experience rating” for contributions, the system may offer an implicit 
subsidy to firms that make more use of temporary layoff. In this setting, when the need 
for a temporary employment adjustment arises, Spanish firms may be relying more on 
temporary layoffs —and less on other adjustment mechanisms— because they can shift 
part of the cost of the adjustment to the public purse through the UCS. Indeed, recent 
studies of unemployment duration in Spain —see Alba et al. (2007)— have shown that 
a large proportion (roughly, 37 per cent) of all unemployment spells in Spain end in 
recalls. Although this figure is lower than those reported for the US and Canada1, it is 
comparable to what has been estimated for other European countries: In Denmark, 
around 50 per cent of all unemployment spells are due to temporary layoffs (Jensen and 
Svarer, 2003); in Sweden about 45 per cent of all transitions from unemployment end in 
recalls to the previous employer (Jansson, 2002); in Germany the recall rate has been 
estimated at 26 per cent (Mavroramas and Orme, 2004); in Austria 32 per cent of all 
unemployment spells ended with the individual returning to the previous employer 
(Fischer and Pichelmann, 1991). 
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate unemployment duration determinants of benefit 
recipients, distinguishing between unemployment insurance and unemployment 
assistance benefits. We use a sample of newly unemployed workers, that is, workers 
who entered unemployment in the first semester of 2000. We take into account that 
worker can become re-employed with the previous employer or with a new employer. 
The former type of re-employment corresponds to the unemployment being a temporary 
layoff (i.e., a recall). For these purposes, we apply a competing risks model to the 
duration of unemployment accounting for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. This 
model allows for two routes for leaving unemployment —a new job or recall— and 
provides specific estimates of the effects of covariates on each exit hazard. 
 
The interest of this analysis is threefold. First, recalls may be viewed as the result of 
implicit re-employment contracts, so that some individuals may be subject to working 
for the minimum amount of time needed to qualify for UI benefits (1 year), collecting 
them for as long as possible (up to 4 months), being recalled to the previous employer, 
                                                 
1
 Larger recall rates in the US and Canada economies are well documented. In Spain, a highly regulated 
labour market imposes many constraints on the hiring and firing decisions of firms. For instance, 
Robertson (1989) reports that more than 50 per cent of total unemployment spells in Canada are 
terminated because the worker returns to the previous employer; Katz and Meyer (1990) report that 57 
per cent of all unemployment spells in Missouri and Pennsylvania (USA) are temporary layoffs. 
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and, then, repeating the cycle. If this were the case, we would expect the hazard rate to 
rise as the moment of unemployment benefit exhaustion approaches2. Second, very few 
works research the forces behind the duration pattern of recall for unemployment 
benefit recipients (see for instance, Katz and Meyer, 1990; Corak, 1996; Mavromaras 
and Rudolph, 1998; Røed and Nordberg, 2003 and Mavromaras and Orme, 2004), in 
spite of large evidence on the effect of unemployment benefits on the unemployment 
hazard rate3. Third, we focus on differences in recall patterns among benefit recipients 
with unemployment insurance benefits versus those under unemployment assistance 
benefits; this constitutes a novelty, as the Spanish literature has only offered evidence 
on the effect that the amount and entitlement duration of each benefit system has on the 
unemployment hazard rate without disentangling the type of exit: new job or recall (see 
Cebrián et al.,1996; Alba-Ramírez, 1999; Bover et al., 2002; Jenkins and García-
Serrano, 2004; Arranz and Muro 2004 and 20074. 
  
Our results show that not only do individual characteristics influence recall and new-job 
hazard rates differently, but also that their duration dependence patterns also differ. 
Second, while the probability of leaving unemployment through recall or a new job 
increases greatly around the time of UI exhaustion, the recall hazard rate of UA 
recipients decreases when benefit runs out and increases thereafter. These results 
suggest that the duration of benefits may have a strong influence on firm recall policies 
and workers’ new job finding behaviour. Finally, we see that larger firms (especially in 
the industry sector) tend to recall their workers faster than smaller firms. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief description of the Spanish 
UCS. Section 3 describes the data and variables. Section 4 presents the competing risk 
duration model. Section 5 disentangles estimation results for unemployment insurance 
and unemployment assistance benefits recipients. Finally, conclusions are given in 
section 6.  
                                                 
2
 This is a well known finding (Ham and Rea, 1987; Katz and Meyer, 1990; Hunt, 1995; and Carling et 
al.,1996). Other studies like Fallick (1991) and Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) find that the effect of 
UI decreases over time, and Micklewright and Nagy (1998) did not find any rise in the hazard near the 
time of benefit exhaustion. 
3
 While some studies have found no effects of the unemployment insurance (UI) level on unemployment 
duration (Lynch, 1989; Hujer and Schneider, 1989; Groot, 1990), there are many studies that report a 
negative and significant effect (Narendranathan et al.,1985; Van den Berg, 1990; Katz and Meyer, 1990). 
Other work has found that the UI level increases job search intensity (Blau and Robins,1990; 
Wadsworth,1990). Regarding the effect of unemployment assistance benefits (UA) on exits from 
unemployment studies are scarce. Micklewright and Nagy (1999) find that the UA level discourages the 
unemployed search effort; Earle and Pauna (1998) detect that the effect is null; finally, Erbenova et al. 
(1998) and Earle and Pauna (1998) find a work disincentive effect of UA entitlement duration on the 
unemployment hazard rate. 
4
 Most Spanish works do not contain information on the level and entitlement duration effect (e.g., Alba-
Ramirez, 1999; Bover et al., 2002). The ones that take this information into account find either that UI 
levels do not exert a clear negative influence on unemployed job search behaviour (Cebrián et al.,1996), 
that UI levels increase the unemployment hazard rates temporarily and that the UA level reduces the job 
search intensity (Arranz and Muro, 2004 and 2007), or that the hazard rate of UI recipients rises 
dramatically when UI benefits exhaustion approaches (Jenkins and García-Serrano, 2004, and Arranz and 
Muro, 2004 and 2007).  
 4 
 
2. The unemployment compensation system in Spain 
 
In this section we describe the Spanish UCS as it stood in 2000, which is the starting 
point for the data set on unemployment duration used in this article5. As in other 
European countries, the Spanish UCS is composed of two parts: unemployment 
insurance (UI) and unemployment assistance (UA). The UCS is financed with a payroll 
tax of about 7 percent, of which approximately 80 percent is charged on the employer 
and 20 percent on the employee; and it is not experienced rated.  
 
Eligible for UI are workers whose unemployment situation is recognized according to 
law by the labour authority; i.e., the job was lost involuntarily, including end of a fixed-
term contract. Eligibility requires Social Security contributions for a minimum of 
twelve months during the six years preceding unemployment. Workers who made 
contributions for 12-17 months are eligible for 4 months; a contribution of 18-23 
months entails 6 months, and so on to a maximum of 24 months of UI for those who 
contributed to Social Security for 72 months or longer (see Table 1). The amount of UI 
is determined as a percentage of the average wage in the twelve months preceding 
unemployment. It is 70 percent during the first six months of unemployment, and 60 
percent the remaining period of eligibility. The minimum amount of UI is 75 percent of 
the statutory minimum wage (SMW) if the worker has no dependent children and 100 
percent if he or she has dependent children. There is also a maximum equal to 170 
percent of the SMW, which is raised to 190 percent if the unemployed person has a 
dependent child, and 220 percent if he or she has two or more dependent children. 
 
[TABLE 1] 
 
UA is financed through transfers from the public budget and it is granted to unemployed 
persons whose total income does not exceed the minimum wage and are in one of the 
following situations: (1) exhausted UI and have family dependents; (2) aged 45 years or 
older and received UI for at least 12 months; (3) did not meet the minimum contribution 
period for eligibility; (4) returned from foreign migration; (5) was released from prison; 
(6) an invalidity spell ended by the labour authority declaring the worker able to take a 
job; (7) aged 52 or older6. The amount of UA has no relation with the previous monthly 
wages. A family income criterion is also used whereby per capita family income could 
not exceed the SMW. A flat rate equal to 75 percent of the SMW is paid to all 
beneficiaries, except for workers aged 45 or older who received UI for 24 months. Their 
benefits vary with the number of family dependents: 75 percent of the SMW if one or 
no family dependents, 100 percent if two family dependents and 125 percent if three or 
more family dependents. UA is time limited and it is conditioned on which of the above 
indicated situations the worker is, of being 45 or older, and on having or not family 
dependents (see Table 1). 
                                                 
5
 The Spanish UCS was reformed in 1992 in order to increase entitlement requirements and to reduce 
benefit amounts. A previous change took place in 1984, and a minor change on the UA in 1989. 
6
 Also, special UA is available to workers of the agricultural sector who have residence in the 
autonomous communities of Andalucia and Extremadura. 
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3. Data, variable definitions and descriptive analysis 
3.1. The data 
 
This paper uses a sample of individuals who entered unemployment in the first semester 
of 2000 and started receiving unemployment benefits. The data have been extracted 
from the HSIPRE (Histórico del Sistema Integrado de Prestaciones), a Spanish 
administrative data set that provides information on unemployment benefits received by 
each worker. The dataset includes information on the type of benefits received  (UI or 
UA), the number of days granted for benefits, the number of days of benefit receipt, the 
number of children the individual has, the benefit level, and previous earnings for each 
individual. The quality of this data set is deemed to be high (see Jenkins et al., 2004; 
Arranz and Muro, 2004 and 2007). 
 
In order to enrich the possibilities of our empirical analysis, we have merged the 
described data with a data extracted from Spanish Social Security records. The latter 
contain information on all employment (and non-employment) spells of workers in the 
Spanish labour market over a three-year period (from June 1999 to June 2002). This 
way, we dispose of information on benefit recipients belonging to the HSIPRE dataset 
regarding their age, gender, qualification level7, dates of start and end of employment 
spells, reason for termination of each spell (voluntary/involuntary or retirement), 
province of residence of the worker, an identifier of whether employment spells are 
accomplished through a temporary help agency (THA) or not, the type of contract held 
by the worker (temporary or permanent), and firm size.  
 
The advantage of using Social Security data for the analysis of flows in and out of non-
employment is threefold8: (i) We have information on all jobs held by the individual 
during a certain interval of time; (ii) non-employment duration is very accurate and 
detailed; (iii) it is possible to distinguish spells ending through recall from those ending 
through the finding of a new job. In addition, the combination with data from the 
unemployment benefits receipt allows us to overcome many of the limitations of studies 
that use data from either Social Security records or the HSIPRE. In some instances, 
Spanish studies using only Social Security data —e.g., García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón 
(2005a)— are unable to distinguish whether or not the individual is receiving 
unemployment benefits. Studies using data sets such as the Integrated Benefits System 
have information on level and unemployment benefit duration (current and entitlement) 
of recipients (Arranz and Muro, 2004 and 2007; Cebrián et al., 1996; Jenkins et al., 
2004). Nevertheless, none of these works distinguishes spells ending through recall 
from those ending through the finding of a new job. 
 
                                                 
7
 The qualification level indicates a position in a ranking determined by the worker's contribution to the 
Social Security system. Therefore, although it is somewhat related to the individual's qualification level 
— since it reflects the worker's professional category and salary— it does not reveal the workers' level of 
qualification, but rather the required level of qualification for the job. It may be the case, however, that a 
worker with higher education is far below the category that would correspond to his formal education. For 
instance, an individual working in the lowest category, “labourers”, may well be in possession of an 
academic degree. As in previous studies using data from the Social Security records, we group those ten 
categories into four groups (see Table A.1 in the appendix) 
8
 A different extraction from Social Security records was previously used to study employment and 
unemployment spells through the use of duration models in García-Fontes and Hopenhayn (1996), 
García-Pérez (1997), and García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón (2005a, 2005b), but they only have data up to 
the year 1999. 
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Since our work focuses on an initial sample of workers who experience unemployment 
in the first semester of 2000 and start receiving unemployment benefits, we drop 
individuals who do not meet all the following criteria. 1) Entered unemployment due to 
involuntary reasons —i.e., dismissals or termination of temporary contracts9. As we 
consider only the first spell of unemployment occurring in the indicated period, we 
obtain a “flow sample” of unemployed workers in the terminology of Lancaster (1990), 
pp. 162; 2) In the previous job, the individual was registered with the General System of 
Social Security10; 3) The individual starts receiving UI or UA11; 4) We have complete 
information on all the variables used in the empirical analysis; 5) Workers must remain 
out of work for more than 30 days. We eliminate workers with unemployment spells 
lasting 30 days or less because they experiment straight movements from job to job 
without experiencing unemployment. Finally, we limit our sample to workers aged 
between 16 and 62 (to avoid complications associated with early retirement).  
 
Since each firm is issued an (anonymous) identification number, which is separately 
recorded for every single spell of employment, recalls can be easily identified. Starting 
from the unemployment spells under consideration in the year 2000, the characteristics 
of both its previous and its subsequent spells of employment were determined12. 
 
[TABLE 2] 
 
After applying the indicated sample selections, we obtain a final sample 6,315 
individuals. Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables used in the empirical 
analysis are shown in Table 2. We observe that around 29 per cent of all unemployment 
benefit spells end in recalls. Therefore recalls constitute an important element of 
unemployment under benefits in Spain. The recall outcome is relatively more present 
among women (57 per cent of recalled workers are women as compared to 47 per cent 
in the whole sample), and on individuals with relatively low qualification levels. 
Moreover, age appears as a relevant determinant of the recall outcome. In particular, 
workers aged 25-39 are substantially more likely to be recalled. Recalls are also 
concentrated on individuals enjoying short unemployment duration: workers 
unemployed between 4 and 20 weeks account for 59 per cent among recalled and 46 per 
cent among those entering new jobs. Other typical features of recalled workers are that  
they held a previous temporary contract for a short period of time in a firm with 10 to 
50 employees, that they received UI and had no children. On the other hand, the 
unemployed who enter a new job is more likely to be a male, to be 25 to 29 years old, to 
have worked in firms with less than 50 employees and to have had longer tenure and 
unemployment durations. 
                                                 
9
 We cannot distinguish between these two reasons for job termination. Workers who quit their jobs (i.e., 
end their employment for voluntary reasons) are not considered in this study because we do not know 
why this happens and these workers are likely to leave the labour force (García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón, 
2005b). 
10
 Since specific regimes like farming and self-employment have different rules for accessing benefits 
they are not considered here. 
11
 We leave for future research the analysis of UA for unemployed have exhausted UI, since UA 
recipients in our dataset are those who do not meet the minimum contribution period for UI eligibility. 
12
 We have no information on ex ante temporary layoffs —i.e., those that begin with a person expecting to 
be recalled. Thus, the ex post measure is likely to underestimate the total amount of unemployment 
affected by recall prospects, since it does not include the unemployment of those who initially waited for 
recall but were not recalled. In any case, this ex post concept gives the proportion of unemployment from 
spells involving no job change (Feldstein, 1975; Clark and Summers, 1979), and it is not ambiguous in 
the sense that it is not based on whether individuals decided what is a new employer and what is not (see 
Alba et. al, 2007). 
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3.2. Variable definitions 
 
3.2.1. Benefit-related variables 
 
We define a dummy variable that equals 1 at each month the worker receives UA 
benefits, and zero when UI benefits are received. The impact of unemployment benefits 
on the hazard is also measured using functions of the time until benefits lapse. We 
include time until benefit exhaustion dummy variables for seven intervals covering 
months before and after benefits are expired. These variables are designated “UB>18” 
through “UB>-10”. Each of these time-varying exhaustion dummies takes on the value 
of one in its designated interval and takes on the value of cero in all other periods. For 
example, “UB12-18” takes on the value one when the individual is 12 to 18 months 
until exhaustion; “UB –5 to –10” takes on the value one when the individual is 5 to 10 
months after benefit exhaustion; “UB1, UB0 and UB-1” takes on the value one in the 
month before benefit exhaustion, the month of benefit exhaustion and the month after 
benefit exhaustion, respectively. 
 
Finally, as a proxy for the compensation variable in a job search model, we compute the 
replacement ratio as a time varying covariate, which is the relation between the UI or 
UA benefits level and the previous wage. This variable is expected to be positively 
correlated with the reservation wage, and, therefore, negatively correlated with the 
hazard function. Duration-dependent benefit levels for each spell month were calculated 
by applying the rules of the UI and UA system to the dataset13. Benefit and previous 
wages were converted to 1992 prices using the monthly retail price index.  
 
3.2.1. Control variables  
 
We control for demographic variables such as age at the start of the unemployment 
spell, using a non-linear specification distinguishing 10 age groups. We also control for 
gender.  
 
Worker’s previous employment history (i.e., job turnover) should be an important 
explanatory factor of the reemployment probability, since individuals more accustomed 
to move jobs are supposedly more “employable”, and thus are expected to leave 
unemployment earlier. Given that the database includes the complete employment 
history of workers from June 1999, we include as a covariate the number of jobs held 
previous to the one leading to the spell of unemployment under study. This variable 
gives us a measure of the number of times they suffered unemployment from that date. 
In addition, the higher the relative job stability (in terms of tenure) experienced by 
workers in the previous job, the lower the hazard rate from unemployment into 
employment will be, due to a higher reservation wage. Tenure in the previous job is 
included through six dummy variables (<= 1 week, > 1 week and <= 4 weeks, >4 weeks 
and <=20 weeks, > 20 weeks and <= 1 year, >1 year and <= 2 years, >2 years). The 
qualification level required for the previous job is collected through four levels of the 
professional category of the worker contribution to the Social Security. We include a 
dummy variable indicating whether or not the individual was hired in the previous job 
                                                 
13
 A time varying UI level covariate was constructed as a 70 percentage of the average wage (in the 
twelve months preceding unemployment) during the first six months of unemployment, and 60 percent 
the remaining period of eligibility. The UA level is a constant (see section 2). 
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by a temporary help agency (THA). We are able to distinguish whether or not the 
individual entered into unemployment from a job either with a fixed-term contract, with 
a permanent contract, or with a permanent per task contract. Workers under this latter 
type of contract enjoy a strong relationship with their previous employer during the lay-
off: this relationship is much stronger than with other types of contracts, since 
individuals retain seniority and other employment-related benefits (for instance, they 
have the right to return to the same job with the same employer, since they have the 
privilege of being requested first by their previous employer on their availability to re-
enter their payroll14).  
 
We control for the industry where the worker was engaged at in the previous job: some 
industries may have more fluctuations in demand or supply than others, which means 
that the tendency to use temporary layoff as a means of smoothing labour force 
adjustments is relatively high, other things equal. Regarding firm size, its impact is 
included through five dummy variables: <=10 workers, >10 and <=50 workers, >50 and 
<=200 workers, >200 and <=1000 workers and >1000 workers. Regional labour market 
and household conditions are also taken into account, through dummies for the 
seventeen Spanish Autonomous Communities and the quarterly regional unemployment 
rate as a time varying covariate. Seasonal effects are captured by a set of dummy 
variables indicating whether workers entered into unemployment in January-February, 
March-April, or May-June. We also include four dummy variables for the number of 
children: no children, one child, two children and three or more children. Finally, we 
control for the duration (in months) of the unemployment period by including dummy 
variables.  
 
3.3 Non-parametric analysis  
 
An explanatory data analysis using non-parametric estimation of the hazard rates can 
provide a first impression of what kind of profile the data exhibit. The following non-
parametric analysis is based on life table estimation. The time profiles of the empirical 
hazards are presented in Figure 1. This figure represents job finding rates for the entire 
sample making a distinction between recall and new-job. These estimates offer the 
conditional probability of exiting from unemployment into a new job or recall and how 
it changes over the course of the unemployment spell. Since there exists a very small 
number of observations for durations above 18 months and in order to avoid noise in the 
results, we have considered these observations as artificially right-censored, that is, as 
unemployment spells that do not finish in the observed period. This is the reason why 
there are no observations with unemployment durations beyond 18 months. 
 
[FIGURE 1] 
 
As can be observed in Figure 1, the empirical hazard rate from unemployment into re-
employment through recall keeps below the rate from unemployment into a new job 
finding. On the one hand, the new-job finding rate basically overall presents no duration 
dependence up to the eleventh month of unemployment. From this month onwards, it 
increases at an accelerating rate throughout the course of the spell. Spikes at months 4, 
6, 8, 12 and 14 can be interpreted from the supply side of the labour market: as the 
exhaustion of UI benefits approaches, claimants are expected to look harder for a new 
job, and are more willing to accept a job offer. On the other hand, the recall rate 
                                                 
14
 In addition, when being laid-off, those individuals receive payments subsidized by the Government 
(through the UI system for the time not worked). 
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presents positive duration dependence until the second month and negative duration 
dependence thereafter up to the eleventh month, showing a notable spike around the 12th 
month of unemployment. However, it finally declines just after the 13th month, 
remaining close to a flatter line from the 14th month onwards. Thus, on the whole, the 
longer a worker remains on layoff, the lower his perceived instantaneous recall 
probability.  
4. A competing risks duration model. 
For the empirical analysis, we specify a discrete-time duration model with competing 
risks of exits following the formulation proposed by Allison (1982). This same 
econometric frameworks has been used by Jenkins (1995), Alba-Ramirez (1998), 
Steiner (2001), Lauer (2003), and D’Addio and Rosholm (2005), among others. This 
type of models is common in the analysis of temporary layoffs where all the 
unemployed are subject to the competing risks of a recall and a new job (Katz, 1986; 
Røed and Nordberg, 2003)15. An advantage of the competing risks model is that we can 
obtain a neat result for the re-employment probability because we estimate the discrete-
time hazard model simultaneously for the two kinds of exists from unemployment.  
 
In a discrete–time duration model with competing risks, an individual’s unemployment 
spell is represented by a random variable T, which can take on positive integer values 
only. We observe a total of n independent individuals (I=1,…,n) beginning at some 
natural starting point t=1. In the data used in this paper, such point is the month when 
the worker becomes unemployed for the first time during the first semester of the year 
2000. Each observation continues until time t, at which point an event occurs or the 
observation is censored. The unemployment spell can end, T=t, in any of j states: j=1 
(re-employment through a new job) or j=2 (re-employment through the same employer 
as the immediately previous one; that is, a recall takes place). The observation is 
censored when the surviving individual is observed at month t but not at month t+1. It is 
assumed that the time of censoring is independent of the hazard rate for the occurrence 
of events, at least after controlling for other factors. Also, it is assumed that the set of 
two states at which unemployment spells end is absorbing and equal for each person. 
 
For modelling the transition from unemployment to employment through recall or a 
different employer, we define the discrete hazard rate. For the i-th person, the hazard 
rate into state j (j=1,2) in period t, hij(t), is the conditional probability of a transition to 
state j in this period, given that individual i has been unemployed until t16. 
 
hij(t) = Pr[Ti=ti, J=j | Ti>= ti]     [1] 
 
Assuming that the competing risks are independent, the hazard rate from unemployment 
is given by: 
                                                 
15
 A problem when estimating single risk duration models is the potential aggregation bias. Unemployed 
typically leave unemployment for different reasons (competing risks). Restricting the estimated 
coefficients for the baseline hazard and the covariates to be the same for all destination states might 
therefore be a very restrictive assumption. Therefore, the econometric model for the sequence of discrete 
choice models is a multinomial logit model or competing risks model; in each spell, the unemployed can 
either stay in unemployment (the reference category), be re-employed though a different employer or be 
re-employed though the same employer. 
16
 According to the simple job search model (Lippman and MacCall, 1976), given a stationary reservation 
wage, the re-employment probability is the result of two probabilities: the rate at which offers arrive times 
the probability that a random offer is accepted. In our competing risks model, unemployed workers can 
either obtain a job through a different employer from the immediately previous one or be re-employed 
through recall to the previous employer. 
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In this expression, the indicator function δij, equals one if the duration is complete 
(individual i makes a transition to state j), and equals zero if duration is censored. 
Therefore, the first component of [3] captures the transition rate and the second 
component is the survivor function which represents the conditional probability that 
individual i remains unemployed in period t.  
 
Given that [3] is in function of the transition rates, we just need to specify the 
dependence of the latter on a set of explanatory variables. For the hazard rate we choose 
the logistic specification that, with multiple events, generates the multinomial logit 
model (Maddala, 1983). It allows for the three possible states considered: employment 
through a different employer; employment through recall; and remaining unemployed 
(which is the reference state category). For individual i, the transition rate to state j in 
period t specified as a multinomial logit can be written as (Steiner, 2001, pp. 96): 
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where Z(t) is a vector of explanatory variables which may vary with time; β is the vector 
of parameters to be estimated; the terms α stands for the baseline hazard which captures 
the duration dependence. The specification of the baseline hazard is very important. A 
common but restrictive approach consists of specifying a parametric form for the 
baseline hazard. This approach is very strong because the assumptions over the form are 
difficult to justify from an economic point of view, and provokes a misspecification 
problem. Instead, we choose a semi-parametric approach (piecewise constant hazard) by 
specifying monthly dummies D(t) which coefficients for transitions to employment 
through recall can differ from those for transitions to employment through a different 
employer. This method presents the advantage of being flexible and assumes that the 
duration dependence pattern may vary among the states. Finally, since failing to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity in hazard models tends to create spurious negative 
duration dependence in the baseline hazard out of unemployment (Lancaster, 1979, 
1990), in our analysis ε accounts for unobserved heterogeneity characteristics in the 
model such as motivation, ability, effort, family pressure, etc. We assume that the 
unobserved heterogeneity effect is destination state specific, time constant, and 
independent of the observed characteristics17.  
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 This is a standard assumption in duration models (D’Addio and Rosholm, 2005; Jenkins, 1995; 
Rosholm and Svarer, 2001; Steiner, 2001). If this assumption is violated, maximum likelihood estimates 
will be biased by endogeneity. That is, the estimated β coefficients will pick up some of the effects of the 
unobservable characteristics, ε. If we relax the assumption and ε is correlated with Z, then the probability 
of exiting from unemployment through a new job or by recall will be affected, and a test for endogeneity 
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The contribution to the likelihood function for a single individual is equal to (D´Addio 
and Rosholm, 2005, pp. 454): 
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where cjk are indicators for making the transition to each of the possible destination 
states at time k; re-employment through a different employer from the immediately 
previous one (j=1), or re-employment though the same employer as the immediately 
previous one (j=2). Unemployment spells that are still in progress at the end of the 
observation period are treated as right censored observations. For these observations, 
both destination indicators are 0, and thus, the contribution to the likelihood function is 
the probability of remaining unemployed for at least the observed sample period. In [5] 
a common procedure is to specify a parametric distribution for the unobserved 
heterogeneity such as a normal, gamma distribution, etc. However, given that the 
unobserved heterogeneity distribution is unknown, Heckman and Singer (1984) have 
criticised this approach, showing that parametric form assumptions for unobserved 
heterogeneity might be biased when the chosen distribution for the unobservable term is 
incorrect. For this reason, they resolve this problem by assuming that unobserved 
heterogeneity is discretely distributed with unknown support points. Those points can 
be interpreted as latent individual's types. Then, the likelihood function for an individual 
may be obtained by integrating the following conditional likelihood distribution: 
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Where ε are the location points (that can be interpreted as intercept for the baseline 
hazard function), pi the probability associated to them, and s the number of support 
points18. In the following section we estimate this likelihood function by maximum 
likelihood to know how individual and labour market characteristics influence 
unemployment spell durations via recall or a new job19.  
 
5. Estimation results  
                                                                                                                                               
will be required. As proposed by Heckman and Borjas (1980) and Chamberlain (1985), the identification 
in such models relies in the specification in terms of leads and lags of all the time varying covariates such 
that their lagged values can be used as instruments for the variables that may be suspected of endogeneity. 
This is only practical if there is sufficient variation over time in regressors. However, identification of a 
model where a test for endogeneity could be implemented results infeasible due to the short span of our 
sample period (see, in this respect, D’Addio and Rosholm, 2005, pp. 454). 
18
 It should be indicated that the econometric approach adopted in this article boils down to estimating a 
reduced form model for employment transitions, conditional on a set of individual and job characteristics 
and on the worker being in a particular initial state. Other features that make this technique an attractive 
and flexible one for estimating the effect of those characteristics on the probability of exit from 
unemployment are: 1) The consideration of competing risks; 2) The incorporation of individual specific 
unobserved heterogeneity; and 3) The fact that no assumptions are made with respect to the shape of the 
baseline hazard.  
19
 We have performed tests for the assumption of ‘independence of irrelevant alternatives’ (IIA) through 
the Hausman test (Hausman and McFadden, 1984) and Small Hsiao test (Small and Hsiao, 1985) in Table 
A.2 in the appendix. In both tests, the null hypothesis of IIA is accepted; therefore, the multinomial logit 
specification seems to be appropriate for each arrival state (new job or recall). In addition, a Wald test and 
a LR test were performed in order to examine the null hypothesis that the coefficients of each category do 
not differ significantly from each other, for all the possible combinations. The rejection of the null 
hypothesis means that it is adequate to distinguish between exits into a new job and a recall job; therefore, 
the multinomial specification seems to be appropriate, since none of the categories should be combined. 
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In this section, we present the empirical results from the estimations of the model 
outlined in Section 4. Estimations have been obtained based on the likelihood function 
(6) by the maximum likelihood estimator. First, we present the results from the 
competing risks model for the entire sample in Table 3 (Table A.3 in the appendix 
shows the results separately for men and women). Second, we present in Table 4 the 
results separately for individuals who receive UI and for those who receive UA. Given 
that both support points are highly significant in all the estimations, exit rates from 
unemployment to a new job or recall are affected not only by measured individual and job 
characteristics of the unemployed, but also by their unobserved characteristics. Estimated 
coefficients and the value of the log-likelihood are affected by the inclusion of 
unobserved heterogeneity. In particular, unobserved heterogeneity increases the log-
likelihood values in the estimations, which indicates an improvement in the fit of the 
model.20 
 
5.1. Results for the entire sample 
 
A number of explanatory variables have effects that are similar across both exit routes 
from unemployment (Table 3). In general, these effects are in line with our 
expectations. Individuals with temporary contracts in their previous employment have a 
higher escape rate from unemployment compared to those with permanent contracts. 
The size of the replacement ratio has an inverse effect on the escape rate. Individuals 
subject to higher turnover (in terms of the number of previous jobs held) enjoy a higher 
escape rate from unemployment, and the hazard rate out of unemployment increases as 
the moment of benefit exhaustion approaches. Finally, concerning the effects of benefit 
variables, UI recipients leave unemployment sooner than those receiving UA. In 
particular, UA recipients are 18 per cent (34 per cent) less likely to exit from 
unemployment into a new job (recall job) than UI recipients. This result is consistent 
with the existence of implicit contracts between firms and UI recipients: workers with 
above-average attachment are recalled faster by the firm that laid them off. This result 
may be reflecting a “last-out-first-in” effect in so far as firms prefer to first re-hire 
workers they already know and value (which is typical of UI recipients). 
 
[TABLE 3] 
 
Regarding cause-specific effects of the explanatory variables on the hazard rates, the 
most conspicuous effects are found for the variables age at unemployment spell, type of 
contract, firm size, tenure in previous job, number of children and gender. People who 
are under 35 years old have a lower cause-specific hazard rate for being recalled to the 
previous employer. This negative impact on the recall hazard rate is most probably 
caused by demand side effects in the sense that the employers do not want to rehire 
persons with insufficient firm-specific human capital (given its high cost of acquisition 
in the open market). In addition, it is possible that young workers are deliberately 
                                                 
20
 A simple likelihood ratio test of a model with unobserved heterogeneity against another without 
unobserved heterogeneity confirms the conclusion that unobserved heterogeneity is significant. Thus, the 
specification with unobservables is identified in the standard multilogit model which is implicit in the 
text. The value of the likelihood ratio test statistic for the entire sample of a model with unobserved 
heterogeneity against that without is 165.716. This value exceeds the critical chi square value of 5.99 for 
2 degrees of freedom at significance level of 5% and therefore, unobserved heterogeneity component 
should be included in the specification of the model. The values of the likelihood ratio test statistic are 
120.514 and 27.416 for UI and UA recipients, respectively. Both values exceed the critical chi square 
value for 2 d.f. at significance level of 5% previously mentioned. Therefore, unobserved heterogeneity is 
also significant in those models. 
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searching for new jobs that more accurately match their preferences (which may very 
well be varying for young persons).  
 
For the type of contract, the effect of the permanent per task category on the recall 
hazard rate is positive whereas it is negative (although statistically non-significant) on 
the new job hazard rate. It is not difficult to find a convincing explanation for this result, 
since workers with such contracts are treated as if they had maintained their 
employment relationship. Thus, they usually do not engage in job-seeking activities 
because they regard themselves as employed and they are virtually certain to return to 
their jobs at the end of the layoff period.  
 
One important variable that provides interesting insights into the way workers exit 
unemployment in Spain is firm size. Two relevant factors are associated with firm size: 
the effectiveness of workers’ representatives and the cost of layoffs for the firm. In 
Spain, firms can have two types of workers’ representatives: the unions (secciones 
sindicales) and the workers councils (comités de empresa). Given that the latter are 
internal bodies formed by employees of the firm, their existence and effectiveness 
depend on firm size. In particular, workers councils can only exist in firms with at least 
fifty employees, and have gained an increasing prestige among workers since the early 
1980s21. In larger firms, therefore, the relevant legislative constraints that determine the 
size and effectiveness of the workers councils are considerably more restrictive with 
respect to the optimising behaviour of firms (Mavromaras and Rudolph, 1998). Given 
the costs borne by workers in recalls —in terms of losses in current income, future 
benefit entitlements and employment security— councils are expected to effectively 
minimize layoff durations in larger firms. Moreover, smaller firms can be expected to 
experience longer recall durations because individual workers employed by smaller 
firms will be less able to influence the timing of such recall. As firm size increases, 
there will be more and stronger workers councils with both the power and the incentive 
to intervene and assist workers’ optimising behaviour. Our results are consistent with 
these predictions, for we find that the hazard rate of exiting from unemployment 
through recall increases with firm size. 
 
As regards tenure in the previous job, the recall hazard rate is larger for individuals 
whose previous tenure is under 4 weeks than for the remainder ones, whereas this 
variable is statistically non-significant for the new job hazard rate. Finally, the number 
of children reduces the hazard rate for leaving unemployment to a new job, and women 
are more likely recalled (whereas men are more likely to re-enter into employment with 
a different employer). 
 
5.2.Separating the effect of UI and UA 
 
We now separate UI recipients from UA recipients in the analysis of the determinants of 
recall and new job hazard rates. The reason for a distinction between UI and UA is two-
fold. First, they are different unemployment benefits schemes whose characteristics and 
objectives differ. On the one hand, UI is received by those unemployed workers who 
have worked for a minimum contribution period (twelve months) and its level is a 
percentage of the worker’s previous earnings. On the other hand, those who are not 
entitled to UI might receive UA. Their entitlement duration depends on age, on whether 
they have family burdens, and the benefit level is based on the National Minimum 
                                                 
21
 The available evidence show greater importance of workers councils as workers representatives along 
time (Jimeno and Toharia, 1993; Malo, 2005). 
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Wage (see Section 2 above). In addition, UI allows job seekers to receive offers with 
more attractive wages, and thus, in theory, to secure more productive jobs, whereas UA 
is granted to unemployed with low incomes in order to reconcile the objective of social 
equity. Second, according to estimation results for the entire sample (see previous 
section), it is reasonable to expect UI to be the benefit payment leading to a faster 
estimated recall (and a stronger worker-firm attachment), while, by contrast, workers 
under UA are expected to have weaker attachment to their former employer (and thus, 
an estimated prolonged recall duration, as was obtained in previous section). Thus, the 
distinction between UI and UA is pertinent in the comparison between contract and 
search models (see, for example Mavromaras and Orme, 2004). 
 
Most of the control variables in Table 4 have different effects on the two hazard rates. 
The time profiles of the recall and new job hazard rates differ by gender, age, 
qualification level, tenure in previous job, number of children, firm size, activity sector, 
labour demand (regional) conditions, and by whether or not the individual has worked 
through a temporary help agency. Men have a larger cause-specific hazard for exiting 
from unemployment through a new job (under both type benefits). However, they are 
less likely to be re-employed by the previous employer when UI are being received. 
Age is an important determinant of recall hazards for both types of unemployment 
benefits recipients. The youngest unemployed (below 30 years old) have the lowest 
transition rates from unemployment to a recall job than their older counterparts. The 
interpretation of this estimated effect is similar to the one obtained for the entire sample 
(demand side effects). 
 
UI recipients with the highest and the lowest qualification levels are more likely to exit 
from unemployment through recall, while the qualification level presents a non-
significant impact on the recall hazard rate for UA recipients. Results regarding tenure 
in the previous job are similar to those obtained for the entire sample: the recall hazard 
rate is larger for individuals whose previous tenure is under 4 weeks than for the 
remainder ones. Having worked via a temporary help agency presents a non-significant 
impact on the hazard rate of exiting from unemployment, with the only exception of UA 
recipients, whose chances of finding a new job increase up to 80 per cent. There exists 
evidence of a negative effect of the number of children on the new-job hazard for both 
types of recipients and a null effect for recall jobs. As regards the state of labour market 
demand, unemployed who receive UI and live in regions with a lower regional 
unemployment rate enjoy a higher probability of finding a recall job, since there may be 
less competition for existing vacancies in their respective locations. As expected, recall 
durations are shorter for large firms, longer for small firms, and duration of new job 
spells are not particularly affected by firm size (a similar result is found by Mavromaras 
et al., 1998). As regards the activity sector, UI recipients from the service sector suffer a 
lower transition rate from unemployment into a recall job than those from the industry 
sector. This result is expected in so much as workers from the industry sector 
(particularly larger firms) move from one job to another with a relatively high 
frequency. We also appreciate that workers receiving UI from the service sector are 
more likely to find a new job. Finally, estimated results regarding the type of contract 
held in the previous job show that duration of recall spells is shorter for benefit 
recipients who have held either a temporary contract or a permanent per task contract in 
the previous job (independently of whether they receive UI or UA). This is reasonable, 
to the extent that, as commented in the previous section, workers under this latter type 
of contract enjoy a stronger relationship with their previous employer while they are 
unemployed. 
[TABLE 4] 
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Interesting insights arise from unemployment benefit-related variables (time until 
exhaustion and replacement ratio). The effect of entitlement duration on the probability 
of leaving unemployment is significantly different according to the route taken back to 
work. Unemployed receiving UI benefits enjoy an increase in their transitions into new 
jobs as the moment of benefit exhaustion approaches; a decline in this hazard is 
observed after benefit exhaustion. This behaviour reflects the joint effect of a falling 
reservation wage and rising job search intensity in transitions into a new job —
Mortensen (1977). As for UI recipients who exit unemployment through recall, there 
exists an increase in the recall hazard rate around the time of benefits exhaustion, and a 
null effect is observed thereafter. This result is similar to the one arising from an 
implicit contract type explanation as described by Feldstein (1976): firms may be 
extensively using the UI system in downturns to the firm’s demand through a rotating 
system of layoffs in which workers who exhaust their UI benefits are being recalled, 
and other workers still eligible for benefits laid-off in their place. Thus, firms expecting 
recall within a reasonable horizon recall workers close to when benefits run out rather 
than potentially losing them to new jobs. In contrast, the hazard rate for UA benefit 
recipients into a recall job decreases when UA exhaustions approach (and only increases 
after some time has passed from the exhaustion of benefits). Remember that those 
workers are expected to be less likely to have formed an implicit contract with their 
previous employer: thus, the recall of UA recipients will take longer and might well 
happen after UI recipients have become re-employed. 
 
The effect of the replacement ratio on both cause-specific hazard rates presents a ∪ 
form for UI recipients. For UA recipients, the replacement ratio exerts a strong negative 
impact on both types of exists from unemployment, and this negative effect is lower for 
individuals who are recalled. 
 
[FIGURE 2] 
 
Finally, let us first consider estimated duration dependence for UI recipients. Figure 2 
shows the estimated hazard rate (after controlling for observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity) at mean of covariates for UI recipients. As can be observed, new job 
hazard rates are above estimated recall hazard rates. This result is sensible to the extent 
that recalls may carry a higher wage due to the accumulation of firm-specific human 
capital.22 In addition, as regards the new job hazard rate, there exists no duration 
dependence up to the eleventh month, but there exists positive duration dependence 
thereafter. As regards the recall hazard rate, there exists positive duration dependence 
up to the second month and negative duration dependence thereafter. Hence, both 
hazard rates show different duration dependence patterns, and these results clearly 
illustrate the danger of estimating a single risk hazard rate, instead of a competing risks 
model. Our interpretation of these results is that revised expectations of the recall 
probability result in increased search activity as unemployment duration lengthens, 
which increases the new job hazard rate. Moreover, since the risk of losing employees 
on temporary lay-off increases with unemployment duration, this would tend to yield 
earlier recall by the employer. These results are coherent with the ones found by Katz 
(1986), Katz and Meyer (1990), Corak (1996), and Jensen and Nielsen (1999). 
                                                 
22
 Fallick and Ryu (1997) present a theoretical model consistent with the indicated relationship between 
the recall and the new job hazard. 
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Moreover, we notice that there are spikes in the rates at which firms recall their 
temporary-dismissed workers in the period just prior to the exhaustion of UI benefits23.  
 
6. Conclusions  
In this paper we have analysed transitions out of unemployment for benefit recipients in 
Spain considering two alternative ways of becoming employed: recall by the previous 
employer or reemployment in a new job. The data set used in our analysis contains 
information on all employment and unemployment benefit spells of workers in the 
Spanish labour market over a three-year period (from June 1999 to June 2002). They 
have been generated by combining unemployment benefit records produced by the 
Spanish Employment Office with Social Security data.  
 
Using this rich data set, we have estimated a discrete-time duration model with 
competing risks of exits to a recall or new job. Duration dependence is accounted for by 
using a semi-parametric piecewise constant hazard estimation. Unobserved 
heterogeneity is also taken into account. We have taken advantage of a rich data set that 
contain information on characteristics of workers and jobs, on duration of 
unemployment and on unemployment benefit related variables. Among the latter, we 
have been able to distinguish between the two unemployment benefit systems: 
unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance. In Spain, unemployment 
insurance is a function of previous earnings and eligibility requires Social Security 
contributions for a minimum of twelve months during the six years preceding 
unemployment. Unemployment assistance has no relation with previous earnings and 
eligibility is achieved when the unemployed do not meet the minimum contribution 
period for UI eligibility but have, at least, contributed for 3 months.  
 
The competing risks model has turned out to be a good empirical framework to 
investigate the relationship between exits from unemployment and the receipt of 
benefits. It has allowed us to find several important differences between the effects on 
the two cause-specific hazard rates in relation to the type of benefits. The time profiles 
of the recall and new job hazard rates differ by gender, age, qualification level, firm 
size, activity sector, by whether or not the individual has worked through a temporary 
help agency and by labour demand conditions. The hazard of being recalled to the same 
employer is reduced for recipients below 30 years old. In contrast, the recall job hazard 
rate is higher for qualified UI recipients who live in regions with lower regional 
unemployment rate, and, also, for women, for individuals who work in relatively large 
firms, and for those belonging to the industry sector. In addition, we have found that 
duration of recall spells are shorter for UI and UA recipients who have held either a 
temporary contract or a permanent per task contract in the previous job. 
 
Comparing benefit schemes, UI recipients leave unemployment sooner than UA 
recipients. Given that UI is typically received by workers with high worker-firm 
attachment, this result offers support for implicit contract-type explanations. On the 
contrary, UA is typically received by workers with low worker-firm attachment. We 
                                                 
23
 As regards UA benefit recipients, the estimated recall hazard rate keeps above the hazard rate for 
unemployed who receive UA and find a new job (figure not shown, but available from the authors upon 
request). Moreover, the recall hazard rate steadily exhibits positive duration dependence during the first 
months (up to the eighth one) and negative duration dependence thereafter, while the predicted hazard for 
new jobs presents no duration dependence across time. We are able to observe that there are some spikes 
after the exhaustion of UA entitlement durations because our data contain employment transitions before 
and after benefit exhaustion. 
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find a negative recall effect for UA recipients, a result that offers support for job search 
explanations (Mavromaras and Orme, 2004).  
 
Our results show that one of the most important determinants of the probability of 
exiting from unemployment is the exhaustion of benefits because the hazard rate for UI 
recipients is higher around that time. Why should the recall rate display a spike as 
benefit exhaustion approaches when the recall decision is at the discretion of the firm? 
Two potential explanations are due. On the one hand, some UI claimants appear to 
search more intensively for a new job as benefit exhaustion looms or become more 
willing to accept any job offer. However, before doing so, they may attempt to secure 
recall from their previous employer. On the other hand, UI receipt helps firms to keep a 
pool of laid-off workers that can be recalled because they are less pressured to find 
work. The recall of UI recipients could be timed with duration of benefits. We have also 
provided evidence that the recall of UA recipients is mainly observed after the 
exhaustion of benefits has taken place. This could be interpreted in a context of firms 
being more interested in recalling UI recipients because of their higher job attachment. 
Firms recall UA recipients only after UI recipients are already recalled or reemployed 
elsewhere. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table A.1 Occupation category groups 
 
Occupation category groups National job category levels 
 
 
High Occupation 
1. Engineers and bachelors. 
2. Technical engineers, experts and 
qualified assistants. 
3. Administrative chiefs and of 
workshop. 
Upper-Intermediate Occupation 4. Non-qualified assistants. 
5. Administrative officials. 
6. Secondary (Minor). 
Lower-Intermediate Occupation 7. Administrative assistants. 
8. Officials of the first and the second.  
Low Occupation 9. Officials of third and specialists. 
10 Labourers. 
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Table A.2. Specification tests. 
 Entire sample 
Test for IIA 
Ho: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are 
independent of other alternatives. 
χ2(P>χ2) 
Hausman 
Omitted: Different Employment. 
Omitted: Recall job. 
 
 
0.557(1.00) 
-2.725(1.00) 
Small-Hsiao 
Omitted: Different employment. 
Omitted: Recall job. 
 
 
95.556(0.129) 
92.777(1.00) 
Wald and LR test for combining outcomes 
Ho: All coefficients except intercepts associated 
with given pair of outcomes are 0 (i.e., categories 
can be collapsed). 
 
Wald test 
Combining different employment & recall job. 
Combining diff. employment & unemployment. 
Combining recall job & unemployment. 
 
LR test 
Combining different employment & recall job. 
Combining diff. employment & unemployment. 
Combining recall job & unemployment. 
 
 
997.151(0.00) 
705.159(0.00) 
1286.979(0.00) 
 
 
1199.518(0.00) 
718.279(0.00) 
1546.954(0.00) 
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Table A.3 Selected parameter estimates (t-ratios in parentheses) by gender. 
 
 MALES FEMALES 
 New job Recall New job Recall 
 Coef. S.E. Sign. Coef. S.E. Sign. Coef. S.E. Sign. Coef. S.E. Sign. 
Age at unemployment 
spell: 
      
      
Age 16-19 -0.172 0.213  -0.773 0.315 ** -0.093 0.207  -0.378 0.243  
Age 20-24 0.124 0.121  -0.437 0.171 ** 0.212 0.109 ** -0.660 0.141 *** 
Age 25-29 0.121 0.110  -0.417 0.156 *** -0.022 0.099  -0.441 0.120 *** 
Age 30-34 0.098 0.108  -0.094 0.149  -0.056 0.104  -0.339 0.123 *** 
Age 35-39  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Age 40-44 0.007 0.122  0.068 0.166  -0.260 0.129 *** 0.125 0.129  
Age 45-49 -0.160 0.139  -0.064 0.185  0.072 0.146  0.229 0.153  
Age 50-54 -0.058 0.143  0.122 0.192  0.039 0.184  0.342 0.180 ** 
Age 55-59 0.061 0.196  -0.217 0.284  -0.152 0.273  0.301 0.239  
Age 59-62 -0.413 0.336  -0.170 0.491  -2.205 1.074 ** 0.657 0.469  
Qualification level:    
   
   
   
Qual. High -0.175 0.155  -0.259 0.242  0.300 0.122 ** 0.394 0.160 ** 
Qual. Med.-High - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Qual. Medium-Low 0.052 0.111  -0.065 0.168  0.053 0.083  -0.056 0.126  
Qual. Low -0.097 0.112  0.027 0.164  -0.211 0.086 ** 0.094 0.115  
Type of contract: 
            
Permanent contract - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Permanent per task  0.072 0.330  2.947 0.324 *** -0.086 0.196  1.717 0.200 *** 
Temporary 0.281 0.105 *** 1.338 0.201 *** 0.179 0.087 ** 0.792 0.161 *** 
Other type 0.482 0.177 *** 1.230 0.288 *** 0.067 0.142  1.173 0.201 *** 
Firm size (employees): 
      
      
<=10  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
> 10 & <=50  0.158 0.074 ** 0.002 0.111  0.063 0.073  0.448 0.106 *** 
>50 and <=200  0.201 0.091 ** 0.366 0.127 *** 0.085 0.085  0.707 0.109 *** 
>200 and <= 1000  0.120 0.115  0.503 0.154 *** 0.002 0.094  0.911 0.122 *** 
>1000  -0.232 0.194  1.016 0.215 *** -0.175 0.136  1.187 0.151 *** 
Tenure in previous job:    
   
   
   
<= 4 weeks - - - - - - - - -    
>4 weeks and <=20 wks 0.084 0.143  -0.467 0.180 *** -0.124 0.137  -0.705 0.149 *** 
> 20 weeks and <= 1 yr 0.090 0.143  -0.257 0.178  0.077 0.137  -0.437 0.150 *** 
> 1 year and <= 2 years 0.123 0.162  -0.540 0.210 *** 0.115 0.157  -1.108 0.187 *** 
> 2 years -0.119 0.183  -0.570 0.246 ** 0.229 0.175  -1.585 0.260 *** 
Worked in a THA  0.269 0.228  -0.321 0.346  0.219 0.193  0.004 0.255  
Unemployment benefit 
status:    
   
      
Assistance benefits 
(dummy) -0.154 0.093 * -0.383 0.129 *** -0.236 0.078 *** -0.413 0.089 *** 
Time until exhaustion 
(months): 
      
      
UB>18  -0.196 0.156  -0.824 0.266 *** -0.522 0.176 *** -1.071 0.332 *** 
UB 12 to 18  -0.195 0.135  -0.514 0.214 ** -0.339 0.134 *** -0.362 0.206 * 
UB 5 to 11  -0.165 0.103  -0.204 0.154  -0.235 0.102 ** -0.289 0.135 ** 
UB 2 to 4  -0.162 0.092 * -0.227 0.139 * 0.002 0.092  -0.232 0.117 ** 
UB1, UB0, UB-1 - - - - - - - - -    
UB –2 to –4  -0.435 0.134 *** -0.025 0.198  -0.274 0.124 ** -0.026 0.167  
UB –5 to –10  -0.377 0.165 ** -0.637 0.271 ** -0.362 0.150 ** -0.065 0.249  
UB > -10 -0.615 0.269 ** -0.535 0.506  -0.006 0.242  -0.059 0.586  
Amount of benefits: 
      
      
Replacement ratio (tvc) -2.080 0.177 *** -2.302 0.246 *** -1.248 0.155 *** -0.680 0.191 *** 
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(Replacement 
ratio)^2(tvc) 0.442 0.048 *** 0.536 0.068 *** 0.286 0.053 *** 0.186 0.057 *** 
Number of previous jobs 0.066 0.029 ** 0.079 0.034 0.021 0.173 0.032 0.000 0.109 0.035 0.002 
Number of children: 
      
      
0 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
1 
-0.035 0.090  0.124 0.125  -0.410 0.082 0.000 -0.030 0.098 0.762 
2 0.055 0.099  0.192 0.136  -0.368 0.100 0.000 -0.084 0.111 0.452 
>=3 
-0.381 0.161 ** -0.055 0.205  -0.660 0.181 0.000 -0.209 0.183 0.253 
Reg. Unempl.rate (tvc) 0.017 0.020  -0.139 0.028 *** 0.024 0.021 0.260 -0.035 0.028 0.208 
Sector of activity: 
      
      
Industry - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Agriculture 0.226 0.648  0.294 0.728  0.687 0.497  0.048 0.444  
Construction -0.034 0.095  -0.347 0.129 *** -0.049 0.168  -1.008 0.287 *** 
Services 0.071 0.085  -0.274 0.117 ** 0.220 0.085 *** -0.118 0.101  
Mass points and probability: 
           
ε1 (s.e.) -2.354(0.360)*** -4.924(0.910)*** 
ε2 (s.e.) -0.321(0.439) -2.220(0.305)*** 
Pr(ε1) 
Pr(ε2) 
0.329 
0.671 
0.036 
0.964 
Number of observations 19,260 18,959 
Number of individuals 3,328 2,987 
Log-likelihood -9,907.549 -8,931.145 
Notes: see Table 3. 
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Table 1. The UCS in Spain after 1992. 
 
1) Unemployment Insurance System 
Duration of benefits Amount of benefits 
Period of contribution 
(months) 
Duration of benefits 
(months) 
Period of benefits 
(months) 
Amount of benefits (%) 
1-11 0 1-6 70 
12-17 4 7-24 60 
18-23 6   
24-29 8   
30-35 10   
36-41 12   
42-47 14   
48-53 16   
54-59 18   
60-65 20   
66-71 22   
>=72 24   
2) UA for Workers (no eligibility for UI): Duration of benefits 
Period of contribution (months) Duration of benefits (months) 
  With family burdens Without family burdens 
    
1-2  0 - 
3  3 - 
4  4 - 
5  5 - 
6-11  21 6 
3) UA for workers who exhausted UI duration. 
UA duration after the exhaustion of UI (months) 
With family burdens. Without family burdens 
Period of contribution 
(months) 
UI Entitlement  
(months) 
 < 45 years ≥45 years <45 years ≥45 years 
12-17 4  18 24 - - 
18-23 6 24 30 - - 
24-29 8  24 30 - - 
30-35 10 24 30  - - 
36-41 12 24 30  - 6  
42-47 14 24 30 - 6 
48-53 16 24 30 - 6 
54-59 18 24 30 - 6 
60-65 20 24 30 - 6 
66-71 22 24 30 - 6 
>=72 24 24 6+30 - 6+6 
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Table 2. Main descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Entire sample 
Mean (S.D.) 
Recall  
Mean (S.D.) 
New Job 
Mean (S.D.) 
Males =1 if male 0.527 0.433 0.565 
Temporary help agency =1 if previously employed through a THA 0.021 0.018 0.022 
Qualification level     
High =1 if Social Security bracket for 
contribution in previous job is 1. 2 or 3. 0.077 0.075 0.078 
Upper-intermediate =1 if Social Security bracket for 
contribution in previous job is 4. 5 or 6 0.131 0.103 0.142 
Lower-intermediate =1 if Social Security bracket for 
contribution in previous job is 7 or 8 0.330 0.257 0.359 
Low =1 if Social Security bracket for 
contribution in previous job is 9 or 10. 0.462 0.565 0.421 
Age Age in years when entering unemployment    
16-19 =1 if aged 16 to 19 0.024 0.023 0.024 
20-24 =1 if aged 20 to 24 0.165 0.120 0.183 
25-29 =1 if aged 25 to 29 0.240 0.194 0.259 
30-34 =1 if aged 30 to 34 0.171 0.171 0.171 
35-39 =1 if aged 35 to 39 0.148 0.170 0.139 
40-44 =1 if aged 40 to 44 0.101 0.133 0.088 
45-49 =1 if aged 45 to 49 0.070 0.084 0.064 
50-54 =1 if aged 50 to 54 0.054 0.068 0.048 
55-59 =1 if aged 55 to 59 0.022 0.029 0.020 
>59 =1 if aged more than 59 years old 0.006 0.008 0.005 
Employment duration  Tenure in previous job (in weeks) 65.779 
(128.279) 
38.630 
(42.981) 
76.840 
(148.276) 
<=1 Up to 1 week 0.021 0.023 0.020 
>1 and <=4 Above 1 week and up to 4 weeks 0.041 0.051 0.037 
>4 and <=20 Above 4 weeks and up to 20 weeks 0.220 0.233 0.215 
>20 and <=1 year Above 20 weeks and up to 1 year 0.411 0.504 0.373 
>1 and <= 2 years Above 1 year and up to 2 years 0.178 0.130 0.197 
> 2 years Above 2 years 0.130 0.060 0.158 
Unemployment duration Duration in unemployment (in weeks) 28.550 
(22.302) 
22.702 
(17.714) 
30.933 
(23.509) 
>4 and <=20 Above 4 weeks and up to 20 weeks 0.497 0.594 0.457 
>20 and <=1 year Above 20 weeks and up to 1 year 0.339 0.321 0.346 
>1 year Above 1 year 0.164 0.085 0.197 
Type of contract Type of contract in previous job    
Permanent =1 if permanent contract 0.153 0.043 0.198 
Permanent per task =1 if permanent per task contract 0.039 0.103 0.013 
Temporary  =1 if temporary contract  0.753 0.774 0.745 
Other contract type  =1 if other contract type  0.055 0.080 0.045 
Number of previous jobs Number of jobs held from June 1999 to 
actual job 
1.769 
(1.197) 
1.913 
(1.419) 
1.710 
(1.099) 
UI Start colleting UI at the beginning of spell 0.813 0.773 0.830 
UA Start collecting UA at the beginning of 
spell 0.187 0.227 0.170 
Number of children     
0 Without children 0.646 0.573 0.676 
1 Has one child 0.168 0.196 0.156 
2 Has two children  0.144 0.176 0.131 
>=3 Has three or more children 0.042 0.055 0.037 
Firm size Firm size at the beginning of spell    
<=10  Up to 10 employees 0.337 0.245 0.375 
>10 & <=50  Above 10 and up to 50 employees 0.298 0.271 0.308 
>50 & <= 200 Above 50 and up to 200 employees 0.195 0.243 0.176 
>200&<=1000  Above 200 and up to 1000 employees 0.120 0.151 0.107 
> 1000  Above 1000 employees 0.051 0.090 0.034 
 
 
   
Sample size  6,315 1,828 4,487 
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Table 3. Selected parameter estimates (t-ratios in parentheses). Entire sample. 
 ENTIRE SAMPLE  
 New job Recall 
 Coef, S.E. Sign. Coef, S.E. Sign. 
Gender (male=1) 0.379 0.048 *** -0.125 0.064 ** 
Age at unemployment spell:       
Age 16-19 -0.149 0.146  -0.577 0.195 *** 
Age 20-24 0.190 0.078 ** -0.543 0.109 *** 
Age 25-29 0.068 0.071  -0.413 0.096 *** 
Age 30-34 0.020 0.073  -0.204 0.095 ** 
Age 35-39  - - - - - - 
Age 40-44 -0.071 0.086  0.151 0.104  
Age 45-49 -0.040 0.096  0.161 0.118  
Age 50-54 0.007 0.106  0.244 0.130 * 
Age 55-59 0.028 0.150  0.123 0.187  
Age 59-62 -0.522 0.279 * 0.188 0.323  
Qualification level:       
Qual. High 0.101 0.091  0.185 0.132  
Qual. Med.-High - - - - - - 
Qual. Medium-Low 0.060 0.065  -0.031 0.099  
Qual. Low -0.135 0.066 ** 0.132 0.094  
Type of contract:       
Permanent contract - - - - - - 
Permanent per task  -0.074 0.167  2.154 0.169 *** 
Temporary 0.249 0.066 *** 1.047 0.127 *** 
Other type 0.256 0.109 ** 1.297 0.162 *** 
Firm size:       
<=10 employees - - - - - - 
> 10 and <=50 employees 0.117 0.050 ** 0.198 0.076 *** 
>50 and <=200 employees 0.147 0.060 ** 0.527 0.081 *** 
>200 and <= 1000 employees 0.083 0.074  0.712 0.095 *** 
>1000 employees -0.143 0.116  1.074 0.125 *** 
Tenure in previous job:       
<= 4 weeks - - - - - - 
>4 weeks and <=20 weeks -0.009 0.098  -0.539 0.117 *** 
> 20 weeks and <= 1 year 0.067 0.098  -0.285 0.116 *** 
> 1 year and <= 2 years 0.075 0.112  -0.783 0.141 *** 
> 2 years 0.005 0.123  -0.942 0.173 *** 
Worked in a Temporary Help Agency  0.221 0.146  -0.148 0.207  
Unemployment benefit status:       
Insurance benefits (dummy) - - - - - - 
Assistance benefits (dummy) -0.204 0.059 *** -0.416 0.075 *** 
Time until exhaustion (months):       
UB>18  -0.262 0.110 ** -0.944 0.200 *** 
UB 12 to 18  -0.206 0.090 ** -0.487 0.144 *** 
UB 5 to 11  -0.166 0.069 ** -0.213 0.100 ** 
UB 2 to  4  -0.073 0.063  -0.218 0.088 *** 
UB1, UB0, UB-1 - - - - - - 
UB –2 to –4  -0.413 0.087 *** -0.051 0.126  
UB –5 to –10  -0.373 0.110 *** -0.307 0.183 * 
UB > -10 -0.264 0.181  -0.239 0.388  
Amount of benefits       
Replacement ratio (tvc) -1.590 0.111 *** -1.302 0.149 *** 
(Replacement ratio)^2(tvc) 0.360 0.036 *** 0.344 0.044 *** 
Number of previous jobs 0.099 0.020 *** 0.099 0.024 *** 
Number of children: 
      
0 - - - - - - 
1 -0.226 0.059 *** 0.033 0.078  
2 -0.138 0.067 ** 0.039 0.086  
 29 
>=3 -0.507 0.116 *** -0.170 0.136  
Regional Unemployment rate (tvc) 0.014 0.014  -0.083 0.020 *** 
Sector of activity:       
Industry - - - - - - 
Agriculture 0.428 0.319  0.268 0.361  
Construction 0.079 0.071  -0.246 0.101 *** 
Services 0.133 0.057 ** -0.170 0.075 ** 
Mass points and probability:  
ε1 (s.e.) -2.951(0.292)*** 
ε2 (s.e.) -1.563 (0.286)*** 
Pr(ε1) 0.254 
Pr(ε2) 0.746 
Number of observations 38,219 
Number of individuals 6,315 
Log-likelihood -19,009.173 
Note: Regression includes controls for 17 regions, unemployment duration (in months) dummies 
variables (baseline) and month of entering unemployment. "tvc" means time varying covariate. 
*** Indicates significance at 1 per cent; ** indicates significance at 5 per cent; * indicates significance at 
10 per cent. 
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 Table 4. Selected parameter estimates (t-ratios in parentheses). Unemployment 
insurance and assistance recipients. 
 
 UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE 
 New job Recall New job Recall 
 Coef. S.E. Sign. Coef. S.E. Sign. Coef. S.E. Sign. Coef. S.E. Sign. 
Gender (male=1) 0.359 0.052 *** -0.131 0.072 * 0.538 0.117 *** -0.186 0.152  
Age at unemployment 
spell: 
      
      
Age 16-19 -0.206 0.177  -0.438 0.227 ** -0.182 0.279  -1.156 0.406 *** 
Age 20-24 0.192 0.088 ** -0.524 0.125 *** 0.238 0.194  -0.511 0.252 ** 
Age 25-29 0.072 0.079  -0.399 0.109 *** 0.057 0.179  -0.355 0.219 * 
Age 30-34 0.084 0.082  -0.156 0.110  -0.251 0.193  -0.261 0.208  
Age 35-39  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Age 40-44 -0.043 0.096  0.171 0.121  -0.239 0.231  0.057 0.232  
Age 45-49 0.037 0.109  0.209 0.140  -0.407 0.226 * -0.017 0.241  
Age 50-54 0.092 0.116  0.266 0.151 * -0.435 0.302  0.265 0.306  
Age 55-59 0.074 0.168  0.172 0.220  -0.435 0.365  -0.020 0.369  
Age 59-62 -0.479 0.305  0.206 0.360  -0.651 0.793  0.293 0.812  
Qualification level:    
   
   
   
Qual. High 0.040 0.097  0.260 0.142 * 0.759 0.336 ** 0.491 0.462  
Qual. Med.-High - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Qual. Medium-Low 0.046 0.071  -0.030 0.111  0.091 0.196  0.108 0.246  
Qual. Low -0.116 0.073  0.206 0.106 ** -0.200 0.189  -0.005 0.237  
Type of contract: 
            
Permanent contract - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Permanent per task  0.057 0.208  2.349 0.194 *** -0.157 0.482  2.342 0.672 *** 
Temporary 0.232 0.068 *** 1.100 0.132 *** 0.415 0.406  1.332 0.638 ** 
Other type 0.347 0.119 *** 1.066 0.186 *** -0.172 0.457  2.163 0.659 *** 
Firm size (employees): 
      
      
<=10  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
> 10 & <=50  0.147 0.056 *** 0.206 0.086 ** -0.011 0.134  0.067 0.179  
>50 and <=200  0.195 0.068 *** 0.537 0.093 *** -0.078 0.149  0.377 0.183 ** 
>200 and <= 1000  0.115 0.082  0.633 0.109 *** -0.168 0.204  0.945 0.220 *** 
>1000  -0.047 0.127  1.151 0.140 *** -0.704 0.336 ** 0.576 0.329 * 
Tenure in previous job:    
   
   
   
<= 4 weeks - - - - - - - - - - - - 
>4 weeks and <=20 wks 0.090 0.128  -0.525 0.153 *** -0.173 0.186  -0.471 0.216 ** 
> 20 weeks and <= 1 yr 0.139 0.126  -0.221 0.148  -0.127 0.200  -0.502 0.235 ** 
> 1 year and <= 2 years 0.120 0.136  -0.718 0.167 ***       
> 2 years 0.028 0.146  -0.831 0.195 ***       
Worked in a THA  0.093 0.172  -0.085 0.233  0.589 0.291 ** -0.257 0.479  
Time until exhaustion 
(months): 
      
      
UB>18  -0.288 0.113 *** -0.946 0.205 *** - - - - - - 
UB 12 to 18  -0.222 0.094 *** -0.484 0.151 *** - - - - - - 
UB 5 to 11  -0.165 0.073 ** -0.259 0.108 *** -0.115 0.575  2.042 0.772 *** 
UB 2 to 4  -0.122 0.071 * -0.272 0.104 *** 0.553 0.375  1.259 0.410 *** 
UB1, UB0, UB-1 - - - - - - - - -    
UB –2 to –4  -0.370 0.098 *** 0.105 0.155  -0.074 0.357  -0.534 0.339  
UB –5 to –10  -0.319 0.125 *** -0.474 0.214 ** 0.632 0.921  0.962 0.670  
UB > -10 -0.319 0.208  -0.245 0.437  2.315 1.693  3.064 1.519 ** 
Amount of benefits: 
      
      
Replacement ratio (tvc) -1.616 0.123 *** -1.255 0.174 *** -1.801 0.249 *** -1.234 0.285 *** 
(Replacement 
ratio)^2(tvc) 0.365 0.038 *** 0.329 0.049 *** - - - - - - 
 31 
Number of previous jobs 0.076 0.024 *** 0.081 0.029 *** 0.173 0.043 *** 0.135 0.053 0.011 
Number of children: 
      
      
0 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
1 
-0.222 0.066 *** 0.020 0.089  -0.430 0.165 *** 0.071 0.190  
2 
-0.089 0.077  0.068 0.102  -0.342 0.173 ** -0.065 0.187  
>=3 
-0.553 0.140 *** -0.141 0.169  -0.320 0.224  -0.151 0.249  
Reg. Unempl.rate (tvc) 0.010 0.016  -0.116 0.023 *** 0.001 0.036  0.011 0.047  
Sector of activity: 
      
      
Industry - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Agriculture 0.568 0.412  0.254 0.455  0.089 0.487  0.123 0.667  
Construction 0.102 0.078  -0.172 0.112  -0.084 0.198  -0.745 0.259 *** 
Services 0.157 0.063 ** -0.152 0.086 * 0.049 0.158  -0.302 0.180 * 
Mass points and probability: 
           
ε1 (s.e.) -2.897(0.322)*** -4.612(0.869)*** 
ε2 (s.e.) -1.443(0.296)*** -2.405( 0.727)*** 
Pr(ε1) 
Pr(ε2) 
0.252 
0.748 
0.146 
0.854 
Number of observations 30,758 7,461 
Number of individuals 5,137 1,178 
Log-likelihood -15,306.743 -3,576.1939 
Notes: see Table 3. 
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Figure 1. Empirical hazard rates of exiting from unemployment into recall or new job 
(entire sample). 
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Figure 2. Estimated hazard rates of exiting from unemployment into recall or new job 
(UI recipients). 
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